

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE:

1. I. [redacted] mentioned how badly [redacted] [redacted] Masferrer, was acting in the US, and how this was [redacted] [redacted] impeding the unification of the many counterrevolutionary groups in the US who recently refused to join in united action, in New York, due mainly to the introduction of Masferrer's name as a participant. That Masferrer is still employing his former strong-arm tactics in intimidating those who speak against him, is common knowledge in the greater New York area. Those other groups who might consider unification are now using the excuse that any association [redacted] weaken their position, since [redacted] (Masferrer) had not changed [redacted] tactics since 1958. [redacted] any counterrevolutionary movement returning to Cuba with his name associated, would repel any movement to join their ranks by Cubans still in Cuba. [redacted]
2. [redacted] accused Masferrer of independently having initiated [redacted] brutality and torturing [redacted] [redacted] characterized Masferrer as a "shark", a blood-thirsty, power-hungry barbarian who had all the earmarks of a brutal, feudal war lord, interested only in personal gain.
3. [redacted] any hope of revolt would have to come from within Cuba, and [redacted] held no hope for the effectiveness of counterrevolutionary groups in the US. [redacted] action groups such as Alpha-66 were, at best, sensational, and offered no solution to the present situation on the island of Cuba nor contributed to what now appear [redacted] to be a delayed and necessarily long-range program for Castro's overthrow. [redacted] the selfishness of the counterrevolutionary leaders mitigates [redacted]

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date FEB 21 1962
by W. H. [illegible]

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE

DATE - DATE FEB. 3, 1964

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against the success of their singular or hoped hopes for effective overthrow of the Castro regime in Havana.

the continuation of Soviet forces in Cuba is primarily for protection of that island against raids by overseas-based counter-revolutionary groups, and for general home defense, rather than offense. an effective, internal upheaval is now delayed at least five years into the future, due to effective measures to detect and destroy the attacking rebel elements' attempts against the government in power.

hopes for Castro's overthrow, not only for Cuba's sake, but for the Western Hemisphere as a whole.

-end-

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